My book Being Rational and Being Right is out with Oxford University Press (you can also buy it on Amazon). In it, I argue against two prominent views of what our evidence is and for a third one. According to the first view (which I call Psychologism in the book), our evidence is constituted mainly by our experiences. According to the second view (which I call Factualism in the book), our evidence is constituted by what we know. I argue that both of these views misrepresent our evidence, and have untoward consequences for what we are justified in believing and doing. The view I advocate for (Experientialism) has it that our evidence is constituted by what we are basically justified in believing. Along the way I argue that the normative force of unjustified beliefs is best understood in the model of the conditional obligations of dyadic deontic logic, I examine the "easy knowledge" problem and I relate the view developed in the book to Evidentialism, Externalism and hybrids of these views (including my own Evidential Reliabilism).
